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or, as Etherington phrased it: "Hobson did not invent the idea that capitalism would benefit from imperialism. Capitalists invented that idea."7
For canonical purposes, though, the terms of the post-Marxian debate on imperialism were definitively set by Hobson, whose views were prompted by opposition to the Boer War.8 Hobson's starting point, which was to become axiomatic to the entire debate on imperialism, was the problem of the economic surplus that capitalism generated. The downsizing and new technologies that an increasingly competitive domestic market generated boosted productivity beyond the market's capacity to consume its output, leaving a glut of both commodities and, since reinvestment was thus rendered pointless, of profits (the "underconsumptionist" thesis). The solution lay in immature markets overseas. Hence imperialism as an outlet for surplus. Since it only benefited a plutocratic few and directed national expenditure toward warfare and away from socially beneficial undertakings, Hobson recommended -that imperialism be discontinued in favor of an income redistribution that would produce a more equitable and domestically viable form of capitalism.9
The details of Hobson's analysis need not concern us here. The crucial feature-which, apart from presaging World War I, distinguishes the "technical" imperialism that emerged at the end of the nineteenth century from earlier forms of colonial or imperial hegemony-is the element of compulsion that arose at the point where productivity exceeded the consumptive capacity of a metropolitan market conceived as finite and contained.10 Co-conditioned by this imperative, monopoly trusts-which maintained domestic profits by fixing prices-and imperialism-which displaced the pressure of domestic limits-were two sides of the same coin.11
The classical Marxist debate on imperialism shuffled the foregoing concepts and derived varying strategic implications from them. Given the emancipatory aspirations of the Communist movement, however, it could hardly remain just a view from above. Initially surfacing at the Amsterdam and Stuttgart congresses of the Second International, in 1904 and 1907 respectively, but achieving full expression a decade of so later in the 1920 Comintern theses of M. N. Roy, founder of the Communist Party of India, the view was expressed that, rather than leading the rest of the world, the revolution in Europe was contingent on revolution in the colonies. Briefly, this conclusion followed from the observation that the bourgeoisie could buy off the metropolitan proletariat, and thus postpone the revolution in Europe, by intensifying exploitation in the colonies.12 This consequence of imperialism was widely accepted, not only by prominent Marxist theoreticians such as Karl Kautsky,13 Rudolf Hilferding,14 and Rosa Luxemburg'5 but by arch-imperialists such as Cecil Rhodes16 and Joseph Chamberlain.17 Although the strategic implications that these varied figures derived from their common perception differed widely, for our purposes the perception itself is significant for its negation of a barrier between the metropolitan and the colonial, which emerged as integrated aspects of a systemic whole.18 This theme would be considerably elaborated in later twentieth-century thinking on imperialism.
Of perhaps even greater significance for later-indeed, for some of the most recent-writing on imperialism is Roy's conclusion, which the classical theorists of imperialism rejected, that the colonized could be the subjects and authors of revolution. At the 1920 Comintern, Lenin made concessions to Roy's position, a gesture that was enabled by the accommodation to Asia that was built into his own theory of imperialism, an accommodation that a Russian revolutionary could hardly avoid. Even though Lenin's Imperialism, the Highest [or should it really be the latest?] Stage of Capitalism (1916) enjoys unrivaled status in the annals of theories of imperialism, apart from its Asian dimension, the work's originality was strategic rather than analytical. In arguing that the small but politically conscious Russian proletariat could sustain a revolutionary vanguard that would lead the feudal masses of Russia's Asian empire to skip over the capitalist mode of production and proceed straight to a socialist revolution, Lenin was not only revising the Eurocentric orthodoxy of classical Marxism.19 Where the dialectic of history was concerned, his theory was also premised on the contention that, in extending the life of capitalism, imperialism enabled it to expand quantitatively but without the qualitative compensation. Lenin was an activist. In the lived exigencies of the practical struggle against imperialism, life had become too short to wait for Europe.
That Asia should figure at all was a fateful sign of things to come. Mao's peasants, agents and bearers of their own revolution, gathered just over the historical horizon, while, further on, Frantz Fanon would declare Europe to be so corrupting that the natives whom it touched could but betray the anticolonial movement. In the crucible of the struggle against imperialism, Eurocentrism would shift from program to problematic. This occurred in a world that had changed utterly since the late nineteenth century, when Marx had been fresh in his grave and the scramble for Africa was proceeding apace. In the post-World War II era of decolonization, neocolonialism, and development, dependency theory would insist that economic backwardness in the Third World resulted from the presence rather than the absence of capitalism, thus turning Marxism on its head. This was despite the fact that the theory's proponents (the dependencistas) either styled themselves as Marxists or closely aligned themselves with Marxism in theory and in practice. In turning to dependency theory, then, we turn to a new style of theory for a new style of imperialism, one that increasingly dispensed with the formality of colonial rule.20 A DUAL PROVENANCE iS conventionally ascribed to dependencia, giving the doctrine a combined North and South American pedigree. In the United States, long-time collaborators Paul A. Baran and Paul M. Sweezy first formulated the contention that monopoly capitalism had stultifying rather than dynamic consequences for economic development. Third World markets were not so much profitable in their own right as on account of the massive state expenditure that safeguarding them triggered: "The loans and grants to so-called friendly governments of dependent countries, the outlays on the military establishment ... all assume prodigious magnitudes. " 25 The following is intended to express some of the central characteristics of dependency theory. Although individual theorists differed in matters of detail, it is contended that most would accept these basic premises. In view of his prominence, I have generally expressed them in the language of Andre Gunder Frank, though this should not be taken to imply endorsement of his oddly amateurish, nineteenth-century style of presentation, which involves tacking together extended verbatim quotations from a range of sources to an extent that can make it difficult to discern whether Frank himself has anything to add. For a judicially balanced collection on dependency theory as a whole, see Dudley ization held out capitalist development as a process of catching up, forgetting that, when the West had been undergoing its own momentous development, there had not been another "West" already there. Rather, there had been colonies, whose exploitation had historically produced-and, in changing ways, continued to produce-the paramountcy of the West. In other words, the great global fact that modernization theory obscured in representing Western history as autochthonous and repeatable was that development and underdevelopment were not two distinct states but a relationship. Underdevelopment was not, as modernization theory's dual thesis would have it, external to capitalism, a condition that prevailed in backward regions that had yet to develop.26 Rather, it was of the essence of capitalism, being both precondition to and corollary of the developed statu?of the dominant countries. In a fundamental break with Marxist temporality, therefore, underdevelopment did not figure as a residue or survival from a superseded mode of production-usually, from feudalism-but as an integral component of modernity. (In this respect, the theory prefigured a key feature of the thinking of the Subaltern Studies group.) Underdevelopment was, in short, a transitive condition (to put it in Foucauldian terms, a positivity)-something that capitalism produced.27 If there were any areas of the globe that had yet to be touched by capitalism,28 their independence of the international division of labor was undevelopment, an intransitive historical separateness, rather than underdevelopment.29
Focusing primarily on unequal exchange, dependency theory provoked controversy in orthodox Marxist circles for seeming to privilege distribution over production. country), the theory simultaneously problematized and, implicitly at least, subverted them (a feature to be elaborated in world-systems theory). A distinctive characteristic of dependency was a hierarchically replicated cyclopean structure whereby a metropolis (also known as "center," "core," etc.) dominated a number of (usually surrounding) satellites (the "periphery").3' In addition to dominating its satellites, a metropolis was itself satellite to a higher-order metropolis further up the chain of dependency, say a state or regional capital, and so on up to the final metropolis, the colonial center. Apart from the very lowest and the very highest links in the chain, therefore, each level had a dual aspect, functioning both as metropolis and as satellite. A crucial difference was, however, that, as metropolis, it monopolized a number of satellites, whereas, as satellite, it served only one metropolis.
Though static, the model was not balanced. Rather, it was emphatically unidirectional. Power-traveled downward: to depend was to subserve. In consequence, the theory was disappointingly undialectical. There was little sense of the metropolis' own dependence on the compliance of its satellites, little sense of the possibilities of contradiction. Above all, there was little sense of ideology, little evidence of Gramscian perspicacity concerning the crucial calculus of force and consent in the maintenance of hegemony, with the result that collaboration figured as crudely utilitarian. Yet it did not have to be thus. At various points, dependency theory was potently suggestive in regard to such matters, only to hurry back to economism as if questions of culture or consciousness were a frivolous indulgence. It has been suggested that Frank's theory was more influential than the sterner stuff that Baran dispensed because it fortuitously coincided with the Western radicalism of the 1960s.32 While there may be some truth in this, we should not overlook the appeal of what lay between the lines, implicit but profound, in dependencia. This applies particularly to the client or comprador role of local elites, whom Frank deftly disparaged as lumpenbourgeoisie. They were the agential linchpin of the whole system, acquiescing in their own exploitation from above in return for the balance left over from what they had expropriated from below-including, of course, the military, political, and economic support that the metropolis committed to maintaining them in power. This deeply ambivalent condition confounds dualistic schemes of domination in a way that is particularly vulnerable to ideological critique. Indeed, Dos Santos seemed to lay some of the ground for Homi Bhabha's psychology of colonialism, though with greater economic and geopolitical .substance, when he observed, "Domination is practicable only when it finds support 31 Surprisingly perhaps, the terms "center" and "periphery" were coined by Rautl Prebisch, the first director of the Economic Commission for Latin America (CEPAL among those local groups which profit by it. Thus we see the irrelevance of the concept of alienation which claims that our elites are alienated because they look upon themselves with alien eyes."33 Shying away from its discursive dimension, however, the theory failed to account for the extent to which lumpenbourgeois leaderships could deploy the rhetoric of national independence to mobilize popular support for programs that actually intensified national dependency. Inattention to this paradox of liberalism rendered utopian the remedy (autocentric or independent development) that dependencistas advocated, a consequence that was exacerbated by the fact that, for all its radicalism, dependencia never questioned the concept or value of development per se.34 Rather than imagining alternatives to development, it sought to orchestrate a takeover bid. Having so stressed the limits of local agency in the face of the enormous power of international capitalism, however, the theory subverted in advance its own commitment to enabling satellites to break free and keep their surpluses to themselves.35
As NOTED, DEPENDENCY WAS CONCEIVED AS UNIDIRECTIONAL-spreading out from Europe, it reduced the whole periphery (the singular is significant) to undifferentiated subordination.36 Small wonder that other schools of thought have since stressed heterogeneity and particularity. In the 1970s and 1980s, Marxist anthropologists and economic historians influenced by Louis Althusser employed structuralist methods to map the complexities of social (including colonial) formations. A Western communist reacting against Stalinist iron laws, Althusser amended the teleology that had characterized much Marxist thought to that point, insisting that modes of production were ideal abstractions not to be found empirically. Actual social formations conjoined (articulated) a number of modes of production. (Even in Europe, feudalism persisted locally in subordinate relations to capitalism.) Rather than simply instantiating (however awkwardly) a predetermined stage of unilinear development, a given social formation comprised a particular configuration of modes of production, articulated together in unpredictable ways that had to be reconstructed anew in each particular case. Of these modes of production, one predominated-that is, it subordinated the others to the requirements of its own historical reproduction. In keeping with Marxist fundamentals, economic factors were determinant, but only in the last instance. dominant as well, as in the case of capitalism, although they did determine which sphere was dominant (for instance, the political in the case of feudalism or kinship in the case of hunter-gatherer societies38). The concept of social formation provided a powerful tool for analyzing the structural dynamics of complex societies in a manner that both preserved their historicity (inscribed in the power balance between the component modes of production) and identified points of tension around which historical transformations could occur. In the course of a long-running and celebrated French debate involving ethnographic and archival data from West Africa, for instance, Emmanuel Terray took issue with Claude Meillassoux's use of technological criteria to define the "lineage" mode of production, arguing that, since the same technologies occurred in different social systems, it was necessary to employ social criteria.39 Terray instanced the Abron kingdom of Gyaman, in which the peasants (lineage mode of production agriculturalists) were dominated by slave-holding Abron aristocrats. Even though the peasants were only liable for the most token of agricultural tributes, they were obliged to be available constantly for the warfare that maintained the supply of slaves.40 Thus the low level of tribute was explained on social criteria, the dominance of the slave mode of production, whose reproduction was the primary determinant of the social formation. On the basis of their account of Portuguese slave-trading on the west coast of Africa, Georges Dupre and Pierre Philippe Rey contended that Terray's model was too static. Tq account for historical change, it was necessary to bring out the tensions and contr dictions between the articulated modes. According to Rey and Dupre, the slave tide had hooked into a chain of indigenous exchanges (slaves for prestige goods) t at had obtained in the political sphere of indigenous society and predated the Portuguese. Since the political sphere had been the dominant sphere, and since the Portuguese trade had intensified rather than conflicted with it, indigenous society had remained intact. Upon the abolition of the European slave trade, however, the capitalist commitment to structural causality rendered such formulations problematic. As elsewhere in this review, I am presenting an overview of the salient characteristics of the general approach. 38 I use the term "societies" rather than "modes of production" to avoid controversy as to whether "hunter-gatherer," "lineage," "hoe," etc., constitute valid criteria for categorizing modes of production, a controversy that I cannot enter into here. 39 See ( 40 Slaves were emancipated into the peasantry in the second generation to prevent them from developing a potentially disruptive class solidarity on the basis of the shared language and culture that their parents, captured from a variety of different groups, had lacked. mode of production had sought new sources of profit, penetrating the subsistence realm of indigenous society (that is, articulating to the economic rather than to the political sphere), which it rapidly dominated and subverted, engendering socioeconomic chaos and encouraging colonial occupation.41
For all its dated mechanicism, the social-formation model brought a welcome leaven of specificity to historical-materialist accounts of complex social structures. In contrast to dependency theory, it paid due heed to local determinations. It also conclusively invalidated the illusory but pervasive anthropological (functionalist/ relativist) image of the contained and homogeneous culture, replacing it with a fissured, unstable composite that did justice to the fact that few if any human societies have developed in isolation. And yet, in suggesting that contingent features of a social formation could be inferred automatically once the dominant mode of production had been identified, the model failed to break with the predictive scientism that has so dogged the career of Marxism. By the same token, it failed to pay due attention to ideological and discursive factors, which were bypassed in the mechanical play of final determinations.42 These deficiencies were not, however, essential to the model, whose deep structural strengths remain recuperable in an era preoccupied with rhetorical form. In particular, the concept of articulation enables us to distinguish between different modes of colonialism (settler, franchise, internal) and, accordingly, to gain insight into the different types of discursive regime that they respectively subtend.43 The sudden rush of formal annexations in Africa during the 1880s and 1890s did not result from a change to this general policy but from a fear that nationalist successes in Egypt and South Africa might jeopardize wider imperial interests, specifically trade routes to India (the Suez Canal) and to Australasia (the Cape). Fears for the security of the Suez Canal led to the British occupation of Egypt, which, in turn, prompted France to annex large portions of West Africa so as to prevent the British from achieving crosscontinental domination. Franco-British rivalry spiraled across the African interior, a situation that Bismarck was not slow to exploit. In this fracas, the strategic priorities that the contending parties displayed were not consistent with economic motivations. For instance, in order to keep the French out of Egypt, Lord Salisbury sacrificed West Africa, whose commercial potential was considerable, in favor of securing the Nile Valley, whose light soil was largely unproductive. Robinson and Gallagher concluded that the European powers had scrambled in rather than for Africa, their primary concern being to deny each other rather than aggrandize non-European, and two European components. From Europe stemmed the economic drive to integrate newly colonised regions and ancient agrarian empires into the industrial economy, as markets and investments. From Europe also sprang the strategic imperative to secure them against rivals in world power politics. As the stock-in-trade of the old masters, these may be taken for granted, although of course they were indispensible to the process. Their role however has been exaggerated. themselves. Once they had acquired their African possessions, however, they wereIn view of its bearing on contemporary debates over postcolonialism, Robinson and Gallagher's emphasis on extra-European factors invites consideration. It should be noted that the enthusiasm with which some proclaimed their theory to be "Afrocentric" was misplaced.55 The imperial interests that motivated British takeovers in Egypt and southern Africa were not internal to Africa, which merely functioned as an arena for the European powers to fight out wider imperial concerns. Moreover, Robinson and Gallagher's "collaborator" category grouped white settlers together with tribal federations, Muslim mujahideen, and other indigenous entities, a conflation achieved by treating those who resided in a sphere of colonial influence as undifferentiatedly belonging there.56 In many cases, white settlers were not so much collaborators as delegates. In other words, Robinson and Gallagher's departure from Europe was merely geographical. In social, economic, and political terms, their purview remained resolutely Eurocentric, a quality reflected in their fondness for colonial boys'-club rhetoric.57 IN POSITING FOUNDATIONS that, though external to Europe, were not internal to anywhere in particular but were, rather, empire-wide and systemic, Robinson and Gallagher's theory begged the basic question of globalization: how are we to conceive of a system that lacks exteriority? This question grows ever more insistent in a decentered era that we might term virtual imperialism, when radically de-territorialized forms of capital flash around the globe at fiber-optic speed, seeking out low wages, tax and tariff advantages, currency disparities, and innumerable other opportunities that presuppose the very nation-state boundaries that their exploitation transcends. Although it would be unrealistic to deny the profound impact of cyberspace and satellite communications, we should resist the techno- 57 Consider one example from scores: ."the starveling colony of the Congo, the theocracies around Tchad, the petty Muslim oligarchies of Ubanghi-Shari, the wanderers in the marshes of the Bahr al-Ghazal, the Coptic state of Ethiopia, the stone-age men living around the sand-bank at Fashoda"; Robinson and Gallagher, "Partition of Africa," 107. A reading of their individual publications would suggest that this regrettable tendency was principally encouraged by Robinson. logical determinism that credits them with effecting a wholesale historical rupture. Throughout the twentieth century, imperialism has been theorized as a global category cross-cut by the discontinuously intersecting dimensions of class, nation, race, and, more recently, gender. Moreover, Lenin's dating of imperialism from the end of the nineteenth century has by no means stood unchallenged, with writers such as Eric Wolf stressing the global significance of the late eighteenth century (the Industrial Revolution), ones such as Immanuel Wallerstein and Samir Amin stressing the late fifteenth century (Columbus) and the renovated Frank plumping (at the last count) for 2,500 B.C.58 The choice of late fifteenth, late eighteenth, or late nineteenth century correlates, of course, with the emergence of mercantile, industrial, and monopoly/finance forms of capital respectively. Whichever one prefers, the point is that globality is not merely a postmodern condition.
A world system dating from the end of the fifteenth century had been prefigured in dependency theory, in which capitalism had rapidly and contagiously converted undevelopment into underdevelopment-for instance, in the Latin American case, had converted Amerindian economies into dependencies whose exploitation was subsequently to prove indispensible to the development of, first, Iberian (mercantile), then British (industrial), and, most recently, U.S. (monopoly/finance) capitalism. This scheme involved spatial and historical considerations that conflicted with the abstract concept of mode of production as theorized in the Marxist tradition. In particular, they were inconsistent with the definition of capitalism as being constituted on the basis of wage (that is, commodified) labor. The issue is similar to that noted in relation to Althusser: actual social formations do not manifest as pure theoretical types. In the case of world-systems theory, though, heterogeneity was (is) not conceived as obtaining between different modes of production as they were articulated together. Rather, it is conceived as obtaining within a single capitalist world-system. To cite two instances favored by Wallerstein, capitalism in urban northwestern Europe required as a concomitant condition of its development non-wage systems in eastern European wheat production (the so-called "second serfdom") and in American plantations.59 Empirically, such considerations had been familiar to Marx.60 As an inherent (as opposed to incidental) feature of capitalist expansion, however, non-wage labor lacked the flexible capacity for surplus production that "free" alienated labor alone enabled.61 On the basis of this 61 To simplify a complex set of considerations, the proportion of the working day that labor takes up in ensuring its own reproduction is reducible by improvements to the efficiency of the means of production, which improvements require the reinvestment of accumulated surplus, one of the and related questions, world-systems theory was driven by the force of its own logic to depart from orthodox Marxism to the extent of arguing that world capitalism had been shaped by the development of systems of distribution and accumulation as much as by the system of production.62
Defining capitalism as "the full development and economic predominance of market trade" and a world economy as "a single division of labor but multiple polities and cultures," Wallerstein held that the two were "obverse sides of the same coin," different ways of representing the same indivisible phenomenon, the capitalist world-economy.63 On this basis, the unit of analysis ultimately becomes the world itself,64 a level at which there is no separating internal from external factors, as in Robinson and Gallagher, since all factors are internal to the system. For Wallerstein, nation-states, which are crucial to the unequal exchanges whereby center ("core"), periphery, and "semi-periphery" relations are constituted, are cut across by the axial division of labor. Although the regional distribution of wealth and power shifts over time, the dependencia-style linkage between development at the core and underdevelopment in the periphery (uneven development) remains integral to the system and persists through alternating periods of growth and contraction.65 The problem with taking the world as the unit of analysis is, of course, the dispersal of agency that almost inevitably follows. Lacking a stable location, "the core" is hard to track down and threatens to degenerate into a reified abstraction. This tendency is exaggerated in globalization theory, where the global system becomes so decentered that it can figure as a kind of disenchanted Gaia that looks for all the world like a hidden hand.66
Defined as a single division of labor with multiple polities, a world system need not, however, cover the whole globe. Nor need it be capitalist. Developing this aspect of the theory, Samir Amin has contended that the notion of a universal as solid as the prison or the asylum. (As practices go, few can be more material than architecture.) Despite this, postcolonial writing has too often excluded historical, economic, and material factors. In terms of the second of our guiding oppositions, it is fair to state that, with the advent of poststructuralist methods, the dominant focus in scholarly discussions of imperialism shifted dramatically from material to representational phenomena. While it is easy enough to lament this development, as many have,70 it should be noted that the introduction of a Saussurian concern with the operation of difference within fields of signification has produced an illuminating discussion of race, an issue that, bizarre as it may seem, had largely been left uninterrogated in traditional accounts of imperialism.71 Thus it is worth considering the historical conditions under which issues of race and representation should have come to acquire a hold on scholarly debates.
One of the major determinants of contemporary global discourse is the significant (albeit limited) extent to which imperialism has been de-territorialized. This is, of course, an extremely complex and still emergent phenomenon. All the same, it is increasingly apparent that the escalating volume, speed, and intensity with which capital, information, commodities, technologies, and people move about the globe constitutes a situation that confounds stable categories of class and location, necessitating more labile, situational, and opportunistic modes of analysis than the repertoire of oppositional modernism makes available.72 As imperialism came 70 home to roost in the form of labor, refugee, and other migrations, the metropolis followed in the demographic footsteps of the periphery, with major Western cities taking on the creolized, multi-ethnic look of a nineteenth-century colonial center.73 Whereas, in traditional theories of imperialism, race had been redundant as an index of domination when that domination was most obviously constituted by spatial separation, in the post-imperial city the reverse has come to apply. Downtown, home addresses are not the main issue-people change neighborhoods more easily than they change races.
The charge that postcolonial criticism understates the materiality of imperialism and rarefies or aestheticizes oppression is a fairly common one. It is carefully put in Benita Parry, "Problems in
Space is not the only material casualty. Marxism's notorious color blindness is symptomatic of economic thinking as a whole, which simply lacks the categories to specify racial, ethnic, or cultural differences. When it comes to difference, the sovereign paradigm is phonology, which is exclusively given over to the refinement of discriminations. In poststructuralist hands, then, domination became a kind of language, with race figuring as an aestheticized construct that belied the physicality of its conventional signs. As we shall see, though, this did not need to be the case and has not always been the case. In turning to the controversial topic of postcolonialism, therefore, my argument is very simple. As noted at the outset, the distinction between the discursive and the instrumental is a false one; representations dialectically inform the (mis)understandings that permeate practical activity. , 1974) . More is involved here than the fact that Said's book was in English or that it employed French theory. Consider, for instance, the following representative passage from a critique of the "neo-orientalism of western Europe" which appeared fifteen years before Orientalism in a journal (Diogenes) that is hardly obscure or lacking international credibility (excuse the length, but it is surely striking): "According to the traditional orientalists, an essence should exist-sometimes even clearly described in metaphysical terms-which constitutes the inalienable and common basis of all the beings considered; this essence is both 'historical,' since it goes back to the dawn of history, and fundamentally a-historical, since it transfixes the being, the 'object' of study, within its inalienable and non-evolutive specificity, instead of defining it as all other beings, states, nations, peoples and cultures-as a product, a resultant of the vection of the forces operating in the field of historical evolution. Thus one ends with a typology-based on a real specificity, but detached from history, and, consequently, conceived as being intangible, essential-which makes of the studied 'object' another being, with regard to whom the studying subject is transcendent: we will have a homo Sinicus, a homo Arabicus (and, why not, a homo Aegypticus, etc.), a homo Africanus, the man-the 'normal man' it is understood-being the European man of the historical period, that is, since Greek antiquity. One sees how much, from the eighteenth to the twentieth century, the hegemonism of possessing minorities, unveiled by Marx and Engels, and the anthropocentrism dismantled by Freud are accompanied by europeocentrism in the area of human and social sciences, and more particularly in those in direct relationship with non-European peoples"; Anouar Abdel-Malek, "Orientalism in Crisis," Diogenes 44 (1963): 108. Malek goes on to implicate one of Said's prime targets, Louis Massignon, who had died the previous year.
obstacle. In terms of scholarly outcomes, however, it seems safe to say that it has not presented an obstacle. Moreover, using Foucault without (say) Gramsci would have entailed an erasure of subjecthood that would have taken the colonizer out of colonialism. In this as in other respects, Said knew what he was doing.
In contrast to Marxist thought-which, with varying degrees of subtlety, posits a gap between reality and (mis)representation-Foucault's notion of discourse is constitutive (or, as he put it, "positive"). As opposed to a distortion put about by the powerful, discourse produces realities-regulating, ordering, and conditioning the possibilities of practical existence. Thus discourse is not simply ideational. Rather, it operates (though not homogeneously) through all the institutions and routines of social life. This basic distinction has crucial implications for postcolonialism.78 In particular, it means that, when Said termed Orientalism a discourse, he meant much more than that the Western academy had disseminated misleading ideas about the Islamic Middle East: "Orientalism [is] a Western style for dominating, restructuring and having authority over the Orient ... [an] enormously systematic discipline by which European culture was able to manage-and even produce-the Orient politically, sociologically, militarily, ideologically, scientifically and imaginatively during the post-Enlightenment period."79 In underwriting Orientalism, the Western academy was, in a very wide sense, making the Middle East, a scenario that credited certain academics with extraordinary power. This consequence flowed from Said's harnessing Foucauldian positivity to a Marxist sense of hegemonic ideology. As a result, rather than a collaborative or dialogic process, discourse became unidirectional, something that the colonizers wielded. It would be hard to imagine a more fertile flaw.
In Said's account, Orientalism has a distinctly Cartesian quality. In producing its other as an object of thought and acting upon it, colonial discourse reproduces the familiar priority of mind over matter. The final object of colonial thought, a category that emerged in concert with Europe's encompassment of the rest of the globe, was the world itself (a historical achievement that Mary Louise Pratt termed "planetary consciousness"80). This dioramic purview was exemplified in cartography, a "projection" that reduced terra incognita to order, banishing the monsters and converting space into place. Ocean but because, as Cook noted in his journal, "it is not laid down in any chart."82 In the discourse of discovery, to chart was to call into existence.
If mapping fixed the world for European statesmen, museology brought it home to the European masses. It also went beyond visuality, rendering the spectacle of empire a performative experience that democratically and pansensorily involved the whole body. One of the key features of museums (in common with imperial exhibitions, world fairs, and theme parks) is the fact that people walk through them; they are shaped and shaping experiences. Their immediacy makes them key sites of subject-construction, as evidenced in their openness to all classes and their incorporation into school pedagogies.83 As various analyses have shown, the two most important discourses in which nineteenth-century museums involved their publics were those of citizenship and empire.84 Moreover, the two were inseparable. Given evolutionary anthropology's all-encompassing phylogenetic hierarchy, any ethnological display was necessarily a statement about rank. For instance, commercial fairs that provided competing industrial nations with opportunities to demonstrate the superior efficiency of their products typically included anthropological displays that illustrated the world-historical development of the advanced technologies in question.85 These displays conflated what we would today distinguish as archaeology and ethnography on the evolutionist premise that "their" present was "4our"' past-that non-European peoples differentially occupied the series of developmental niches through which European society had progressively raised itself. Thus space and time were collapsed; to travel beyond the bounds of European civilization was to travel back in time.86 This global narrative was reenacted by the museum-or fair-going public when they moved between stands, pavilions, or model villages-a sensation that, at the larger fairs, was cemented by the provision of railways and other atmospheric devices designed to popularize imperial subjecthood.
In 88 A brilliant example is Tony Bennett's argument that nineteenth-century museums performed a function complementary to Foucault's carceral prisons and asylums, which only operated in cases where the museum's (and related civic institutions') production of a docile and self-regulating citizenry failed. In the museum, the crowd is not so much subject to a controlling view from above, a la Foucauldian panopticon, as exchanging looks between themselves, a "self-monitoring system of looks" that forms "a technology of vision which served not to atomize and disperse the crowd but to regulate it, and to do so by rendering it visible to itself, by making the crowd itself the ultimate spectacle"; Bennett, Birth of the Museum, 68. The possibilities of this approach for analyzing the construction of racial subjectivities in contexts like that of the museum, where anthropological displays incite glances across, between, and within "races," seem to me to be considerable. of subjectivity, a universal taken-for-grantedness in relation to which difference could only constitute default. In Writing Degree Zero, Roland Barthes provided a model for this elusive concept, associating the first cracks in bourgeois hegemony with the emergence of a concern with style-a concern which, in conceding that writing was not simply "white," a neutral medium for the copying of reality, conceded the disruptive possibility of alternatives.10' Like nature itself, white writing is just therel02; its power lies in its authorlessness (hence the embarrassing egotism of some postmodernist writing). To resist this kind of power-to tackle the Mercator behind the projection-it is first of all necessary to denaturalize it, to bring out the idiosyncracy of universal categories. Thus the concerted poststructuralist assault on Reason, Progress, the Nation, the Citizen, etc.
So far as historians are concerned, this assault would seem to have reached an end of sorts in Dipesh Chakrabarty's disconcerting, conclusion that Europe is the subject of history-that the very historical project itself, regardless of its contents or emphases, is inherently and inescapably Eurocentric.103 At first sight, Chakrabarty might seem to have mistaken history for geography. After all, as should be clear by now, Europe may occupy a fixed portion of the map, but its history is ubiquitous. But this (I think) is Chakrabarty's whole point-through inscribing its creole genealogy; we begin to undo Europe's arrogation of universal subjectivity.104 In its positive or critical aspect, therefore, his ostensibly pessimistic thesis enjoins an invigorating politics, the project of provincializing Europe. 106 Since well before Orientalism, scholars writing on India have been doing forms of discourse analysis on the modernity of tradition, generally focusing on the codifications of Hindu law that were and nationalist discourse. Hence, too, Chatterjee's project of claiming "for us, the once-colonized, our freedom of imagination." 107 The notion of exteriority is, of course, unsatisfactory here, since exteriority is not freestanding but is a determinate residue of interiority. Yet it is extremely difficult to find a better word. This difficulty itself illustrates the depth of the problem, which is one of the starting points of deconstruction. Subaltern discourse is not simply a mirroring negation of colonizing discourse. Hindu-Muslim communalism, for instance, is not some feudal survival, a transcendent essence that repetitively recruits human agents to frustrate postcolonial modernity. Rather, communalism is an integral component of modernity, concretely and specifically grounded in the complex modern consciences of those who participate in it. (The point recalls the distinction between undevelopment and underdevelopment.) To narrate the phenomenology of practical historical consciousness (in this case, of the subaltern), it is necessary to confound the essences and teleologies that colonial discourse ceaselessly disseminates; in Gyan Prakash's phrase, it is necessary to write "post-foundational" histories. 108 To adopt Homi Bhabha's much-adopted terminology, the modern condition that includes but also exceeds colonialism's binomial categories can be expressed as hybridity. In Bhabha's theory, which represents a high point in the aestheticization of race, the concept of hybridity registers the (post)colonial co-production of Europe and its others, going beyond notions of colonial discourse as a unilateral projection to open up the reciprocal complexities of the colonial encounter. Hybridity confronts colonial discourse with the threat of recognition; the other is like, but only partially like, self-"almost the same but not quite/white."'109 With an unerring eye for contradiction, Bhabha repetitively points to the effort that colonial discourse was obliged to put into rehabilitating stereotypes that, though meant to be eternal, were constantly subject to historical change. In its anxious renovation of the racial essences that underpinned domination, colonial discourse betrayed a profound ambivalence. On the one hand, it strove to domesticate-to assimilatethe native; on the other, it was undone-deauthorized, disavowed-by the partial resemblance, the "difference between being English and being Anglicized" that was thus produced.'10 Sincere or not, sly or not, imitation was a profoundly threatening form of flattery. The scornful stereotype of the Indian mimicking Englishness attested to the colonizer's fear of that which was held back in mimicry, of the recalcitrant brownness that mocked even as it mimicked. Recognizable in a brown skin, Englishness broke down.
IN ITS BASIC FORM, HYBRIDITY is, of course, a palpably material outcome of the primary subversion of the colonial divide. Wherever they have gone, male colonizers have impregnated native women."' This notwithstanding, issues of gender and sexuality (especially homosexuality) have until relatively recently been marginalized in scholarly discussions of imperialism.12 Over the past decade or so, however, our understanding of the complexities of the colonial encounter has been enriched and transformed by an emergent body of work whose significance can hardly be overstated. To survey this work would require an article on its own. I shall merely indicate a few directions here.
As in so many areas, feminist scholars of imperialism have been obliged to labor the most elementary of points before being able to move on to more demanding questions. Thus they have had to remind us (or, at least, too many of us) that women were there too and that women have colonized and been colonized in different ways to men. Much of this work has been recuperative, rereading the imperial archive to disclose its female dimension.13 White women in the colonies have emerged in all their variety, exploding the stereotypical opposition that James Buzard has characterized as "the Spinster Abroad and the Memsahib, the eccentric traveler and the pampered Hill Station denizen."114 Attempts by female scholars from the West to recover Third World women's experiences from against the grain of patriarchal discourse have, however, provoked controversy. A number of scholars, mainly from the Third World, have objected that the sharing of gender does not entitle Western women to claim a sharing of experience substantial enough to transcend the colonial divide from which they themselves have historically benefited.115 Moreover, in taking up the cudgels on behalf of brown women against brown men, Western feminists have resuscitated a stock justification for colonialism. As Gayatri Spivak and, following her, Lata Mani have argued (their common example is sati in British India), the championing of native women's rights provided colonial authorities with a pretext for imposing their own order on native society.116 Who, then, can speak for subaltern women who lack access to the academy? The very existence of an academic discourse on colonial discourse attests to the hazards of ethnographic ventriloquism.117
Gender is not, however, restricted to women. Rather, as Joan Scott so influentially stated, it is a way of encoding power relations.118 Following up some hints in Said's Orientalism,119 a number of scholars have analyzed the inherent genderedness of the colonial project. This has been most apparent when colonialism has functioned as a discourse on land, which, in settler colonies in particular, has enhanced by bringing poststructuralist rigor to bear on materialist approaches to ideology. (Neo)structurally, the concept of social formation enables us to specify material conditions that favor the currency of particular colonial discourses. For instance, the narrative of the dying race, which harmonizes with the project of removing natives from the land, is congenial to settler colonization. It is incompatible with franchise colonization, where native labor is at a premium. Though black, therefore, Australian Aborigines have discursively figured as dying rather than as being endowed with a natural sense of rhythm. On the same basis, the colonization of Native Americans has been structurally distinct from the colonization of African Americans. In the main, Native (North) Americans were cleared from their land rather than exploited for their labor, their place being taken by displaced Africans, who provided labor to be mixed with the expropriated land, their own homelands having yet to become objects of colonial desire. Thus the two colonial relationships were (are) fundamentally opposed. The ramifications of this distinction extend to the present, particularly insofar as they affect the different constructions of "miscegenation" that have been applied to the two communities.'24 Briefly, while the "one-drop rule" has meant that the category "black" can withstand unlimited admixture, the category "red" has been highly vulnerable to dilution.125 This is consistent with a situation in which, while black labor was commodified (so that white plantation owners fathered black children), red labor was not even acknowledged (so that white fathers generated "half-breeds" whose indigeneity was compromised). In Australia, the structural counterparts to African-American slaves were white convicts, which has meant that racial coding and questions of emanci-pation have operated quite differently between the two countries. Where the respective indigenous populations have been concerned, however, there are substantial similarities between the racial calculations on which official policies toward them have been predicated. Such discursive distinctions, which survive the de-territorialization of imperialism, are clearly of considerable historical significance. They only make sense in relation to the material conditions that historically shaped the different colonial relationships concerned.'26 If we wish to produce histories that tell -us enough about imperialism to suggest ways of resisting it, we should start with these conditions. 
Patrick Wolfe is an

